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Abstract A heavily immunosuppressed, 43-kg, 9-year-old
patient was recovering from a bone marrow transplant.
Primary prophylaxis against invasive fungal infections was
liposomal amphotericin B (AmBisome, 2.3 mg/kg [100
mg] two times per week). Once home, following a first
amphotericin B infusion, he presented with strong diar-
rhoea and vomiting; this was repeated after the second
infusion. The clinical situation worsened rapidly and the
patient was rehospitalised. On admission, he presented with
acute renal failure. During the 2-week hospitalisation, renal
function recovered progressively. A few days after
returning home, a new administration of amphotericin B
was again followed by diarrhoea and vomiting, together
with shivering and fever. The child was again rapidly
rehospitalised. Investigation revealed that the community
pharmacist, relying on drug software, had selected an
inappropriate substitute drug: the patient had been admin-
istered amphotericin B deoxycholate (Fungizone) and not
liposomal amphotericin B. Depending on the indication,
intravenous AmBisome is usually administered at a dose
between 3 and 5 mg/kg bodyweight; this dose can be
increased to up to 10 mg/kg/day. Intravenous Fungizone,
however, should be administered using an initial dose of
0.25 mg/kg bodyweight, up to a recommended 1-mg/
kg/day dose. The child had thus received 100 mg of Fun-
gizone, or ten times the recommended dose.
Key Points
Galenical forms of amphotericin B are not
equivalents. With specific regard to amphotericin B
deoxycholate (Fungizone), it must be remembered
that the benchmark dose is 1 mg/kg/day.
The use of information technologies should in no
way exempt healthcare professionals from a duty to
critically monitor prescriptions and carry out safety
checks.
Introduction
Adverse drug events (ADEs) are an unfortunate but
recurrent problem in healthcare systems. In paediatric
patients, medication-related incidents accounted for
0.5–3.3 % of emergency visits and 0.16–4.3 % of hospital
admissions; 20.3–66.7 % of these were estimated to be
preventable [1]. Beyond the everyday problems of mis-
taking the names of closely related drugs (i.e. look alikes or
sound alikes), different galenical formulations of the same
active ingredient, which are not equivalents from a pre-
scriptive point of view, present an added risk of confusion.
The present article describes the case of a paediatric
patient who experienced a serious ADE because of a mix-
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up between two forms of intravenously administered
amphotericin B: a conventional deoxycholate formulation
(Fungizone) and the liposomal formulation (AmBi-
some). Subsequently, our discussion is in three parts. Part
one concentrates on the different available formulations of
amphotericin B and their associated nephrotoxicity. To
provide the context surrounding the factors contributing to
this error, part two briefly explains how this drug is dis-
pensed in Switzerland. Using an Ishikawa diagram (a root-
cause analysis), part three synthesises the conclusions
reached on the causes of this ADE and suggests means of
avoiding any repetition of this dangerous mistake.
Case Report
A heavily immunosuppressed 9-year-old boy weighing 43
kg was recovering from a bone marrow transplant.
Immunosuppressive therapy consisted of prednisolone 0.8
mg/kg/day, mycophenolate mofetil 20 mg/kg/day split into
two equal doses and two sessions of photopheresis every 2
weeks. Primary prophylaxis against invasive fungal infec-
tions was a prescription of liposomal amphotericin B
(AmBisome, 2.3 mg/kg (100 mg) two times per week).
Once at home, following a first infusion of amphotericin B,
the patient presented with strong diarrhoea and vomiting,
and this was repeated after the second infusion. The clin-
ical situation worsened rapidly and the patient was rehos-
pitalised the same day. On admission, he presented with
acute renal failure. Over the following 2 weeks of hospi-
talisation, renal function recovered progressively; the
decompensation was attributed to the additional adverse
effects of the nephrotoxic treatments prescribed in the
context of the earlier transplant. These drugs were conse-
quently adapted or stopped; however, this implied a greatly
increased risk of the development of a graft-vs.-host dis-
ease. Levels of corticosteroids were increased, leading to
difficulties in managing arterial blood pressure and the
recurrence of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus. During
hospitalisation, amphotericin B was recommenced, and
three infusions were administered with no
notable problems.
A few days after returning home, a new administration
of amphotericin B was again followed by diarrhoea and
vomiting, together with shivering and fever. The child was
once again rapidly rehospitalised, and given a combination
antibiotic on the suspicion of an infected central venous
catheter.
Suspecting a medication error, the clinical team asked
the patient’s family to bring in the infusion bags used in
their home. By examining the labels on the bags, it was
discovered that the drug administered had in fact been
amphotericin B deoxycholate (Fungizone) and not
liposomal amphotericin B (AmBisome). This had led to
the patient experiencing an amphotericin B overdose. He
eventually recovered from this after several extra weeks in
hospital.
Depending on the indication, intravenous AmBisome
is usually administered at a dose between 3 and 5 mg/kg
bodyweight; this dose can be increased to up to 10 mg/
kg/day. Intravenous Fungizone, however, should be
administered using an initial dose of 0.25 mg/kg body-
weight, up to a recommended 1-mg/kg/day dose. The child
had thus received 100 mg of Fungizone, or ten times the
recommended dose. The community pharmacy that dis-
pensed the drugs was contacted and questioned. When
AmBisome is not in stock, pharmacy staff choose an
alternative from amongst the propositions given by the
pharmacy’s software; this sorts available drugs by principal
active ingredient, the recommended International Non-
proprietary Name (INN). AmBisome had thus been sub-
stituted by Fungizone on the assumption that they were
generic drug formulations. Pharmacy dispensary records
showed that the patient had been given Fungizone instead
of AmBisome each time he had come for his out-patient
prescription.
Discussion
The Nephrotoxicity of Different Formulations
of Amphotericin B
Amphotericin B plays a central role in the prevention and
treatment of severe, deep systemic fungal infections. The
conventional formulation is amphotericin B deoxycholate
(Fungizone). Nevertheless, this formulation frequently
causes renal function disorders, including a decreased
glomerular filtration rate. Indeed, the two studies involving
the largest cohorts to associate amphotericin B deoxy-
cholate with nephrotoxicity reported an incidence of over
25 % in the 494 and 643 patients treated with the drug [2,
3]. One suggested mechanism [4] for this ADE is a com-
bination of two phenomena. The first phenomenon involves
amphotericin B directly inducing renal vasoconconstriction
or provoking glomerular feedback owing to its antifungal
influence on sodium entering juxtaglomerular cells. The
second phenomenon is the result of tubular toxicity, which
alters ions permeability. The binding of amphotericin B to
the cholesterol in cell membranes probably mediates this
permeability in part. However, it is probably also partly
mediated by the deoxycholate detergent, which solubilises
the original drug formulation, but not the liposomal one. To
avoid the toxicity induced by this excipient, other formu-
lations were developed, and they did indeed cause fewer
ADEs of this type [5]. Three other galenical formulations
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are currently available on the global market. These include
a lipid complex formulation of amphotericin B phospho-
lipids (Abelcet), a liposomal formulation of amphotericin
B liposomes (AmBisome) and a lipid formulation con-
taining a complex of amphotericin B and sodium choles-
teryl sulphate (Amphotec). The case study described here
took place in Switzerland, where only Fungizone and
AmBisome are currently available on the market. To put
the contributing factors of this error into context, the sec-
ond part of our discussion briefly describes how drugs such
as amphotericin B are dispensed on a patient’s discharge
from hospital in Switzerland.
Dispensing Drugs at Patient Discharge
from Hospital
In Switzerland, there is no list of restricted drugs that can
only be dispensed by hospital pharmacies. Furthermore, for
regulatory reasons, when a patient is discharged, hospital
pharmacies are not allowed to dispense their drugs for
outpatient treatment. The hospital physician writes a pre-
scription listing the necessary drugs, but the patient or his/
her family must go to outpatient institutions, such as
community pharmacies, for the drugs to be dispensed.
Regulations demand that the pharmacist must personally
validate each prescription. Furthermore, the pharmacist
must follow the minimum criteria required by the explicit
procedures for monitoring doses and prescription restric-
tions, and if he/she were to detect any major contraindi-
cations, then he/she should contact the prescribing
physician [6].
An Analysis of the Error and Suggested Prevention
Strategies
In her thesis, Kaestli [7] evaluated the risks of the dis-
continuity of pharmaceutical care at paediatric hospital
discharge. A systematic prospective analysis of the risks
involved in this process was made using the FEMCA
method (Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis).
This work synthesised the factors contributing to ADEs at
paediatric hospital discharge into a root cause (or Ishikawa)
diagram, and it gave particular attention to the role of
community pharmacists. Figure 1 is a modified version of
that diagram; it focuses closely on the most important error
that took place in the case at hand, the dosage error.
Kaestli’s potential errors contributing to ADEs are
shown in black. On examining our patient’s case, we
have highlighted (in blue) three factors that seem to have
been particularly linked to the error at hand: an unusual
pathology/treatment; an unfamiliarity with hospital
treatments; and perhaps, because to err is human, for-
getfulness/carelessness. We discuss below the measures
that have since been put in place to avoid these
problems.
Nevertheless, these factors failed to explain the problem
in its entirety, and it seemed necessary to add a series of
further potential risks or problems (in red) that might also
have contributed to the error. In the diagram, the ‘Wrong
dosage’ branch now features three supplementary potential
causes of an error: (1) the absence of a shared patient
medical record; (2) inadequate software, or reliance on
software alone; and (3) insufficient safety checks. These
sub-branches are evaluated below.
The primary factor contributing to the error was the
absence of a shared medical record. The healthcare pro-
fessionals dealing with the patient do not all have access to
the same information, notably, in the present case, with
regard to the chosen therapy. Had information on the
preparation dispensed by the community pharmacist been
available immediately to hospital physicians, successive
administrations of the wrong drug may have been avoided.
One potential future solution to this problem will
undoubtedly come in the form of health information tech-
nologies (HIT); a shared electronic medical record avail-
able to all the healthcare professionals involved in patient
management is, for example, slowly being introduced
across Switzerland [8], but it is not yet the norm. Until such
exchanges of information are the norm, healthcare pro-
fessionals should make the most of every opportunity to
communicate with each other. If the prescription is the only
interaction between the hospital physician and the com-
munity pharmacist, adding a reference stating that a pre-
scribed drug ‘‘must not substituted’’ could easily be done.
Involving patients and their families and training them to
be active expert participants in their own treatment, as
suggested by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
(ISMP) [9], would be another way of helping to improve
safety and the continuity of care.
Although HIT might have improved the situation in the
present case in terms of continuity of patient safety,
information technology was also the second contributing
factor to this medical error. A branch concerning the
potential dangers of HIT was thus added to the Ishikawa
diagram. Perhaps because validation of the information
contained in HIT and the way in which they treat data and
algorithms are not subject to any strict regulatory regime,
there is a perceived lack of critical judgement in the face of
new technologies, despite healthcare professionals know-
ing these systems are not infallible. In the same way, when
data are badly presented, poor interfaces do not help users
work to the best of their abilities. In the case presented
here, we can suppose that the presentation of the data is one
of the contributing factors to the final error. Working with
the INN, the software proposes pharmaceutical formula-
tions that seem to be bioequivalents.
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Thus, we cannot deal with the causes of this error
without involving amphotericin B’s INN. To ensure
unambiguous prescription, using the INN system is gen-
erally recommended, and attributing INNs is one of the
World Health Organization’s roles in standardisation. The
specialist team examining a particular substance aims to
precisely identify its composition and find close links to
other substances used as drugs. When a new INN is pro-
posed, the team tries to ensure that there are no conflicts or
confusions with existing names, no undesirable medical
connotations and no other particular linguistic problems
[10]. This system no longer appears to be sufficient.
Today’s galenical technologies both complicate and
change drugs’ pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics
and thus how they should be dosed. The attribution of new
INNs should, therefore, take into consideration the fact that
many principal ingredients are no longer interchangeable.
There are already examples of this, although they are rare:
paclitaxel poliglumex is a biodegradable polymer of
paclitaxel; its INN distinguishes it from conventional
paclitaxel. This important change in thinking should begin
today as INNs are the foundation of the Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical classification system and defined
daily dose measuring. Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
codes are widely used in drug databases, forming part of
the structured data that flow through prescription systems
or automated dispensing cabinets.
In the case of amphotericin B, one solution might be to
attribute the drug an INN (Modified) [INNM]. This pos-
sibility already exists, especially in cases where the active
molecules need to be expanded for various reasons, such as
formulation purposes. Indeed, with this in mind, we have
now asked the World Health Organization to give
amphotericin B deoxycholate an INNM and add it to the
classification.
While awaiting this addition, and wherever possible,
whenever software makes a therapeutic suggestion it is
important that all entries be validated by a pharmacist.
The final contributing factor to this medical error, and
the last branch added to the Ishikawa diagram, concerns the
critical monitoring that should be carried out for medical
prescriptions. We wish to note that purely inpatient hospital
experiences did not help us to better address the specific
problem of confusion in the formulations of amphotericin
B. During informal free discussions about this error with
teams of healthcare professionals, we realised that certain
Fig. 1 Adapted version of Kaestli’s Ishikawa diagram focusing on
the factors that contributed to a dosage error by a community
pharmacist. Blue factors were particularly relevant in this adverse
drug event. The contributing factors in red are newly identified ones
and were added to the diagram subsequent to this case study
Reproduced from Kaestli et al. [7], with permission
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colleagues were also unaware of the differences between
products. We learnt that similar incidents had occurred
within our institution, and we learnt of other identical
errors that had happened in other local hospitals. Faced
with the possibility of a repeat incident, we decided that
immediate action was necessary for the safety of our
patients. Because we were not in a position to influence
high staff turnover rates, rapid staff training for those
involved or any other type of long-term solution, we
managed to block the prescription of conventional
amphotericin B using our hospital’s paediatric department
Computerized Provider Order Entry system, and remove
Fungizone from the drug stocks in our care units.
This digression on our local experience highlights the
final branch added to Fig. 1: whatever the situation, critical
monitoring of prescriptions is a must. This also brings us to
the first three (blue) branches on the diagram that we
believed were significant contributing factors in the error:
unusual pathology/treatment, unfamiliarity with hospital
treatments, and forgetfulness/carelessness. We believe that
adequate safety measures should have flagged or stopped
these issues.
Indeed, despite galenical changes, amphotericin B
remains a drug with a narrow therapeutic window, and it
must be handled with great care. It remains to be seen
precisely what ‘great care’ implies in terms of potential
solutions. In 2007, the ISMP published advice on avoiding
confusion between amphotericin B drugs, as these had
caused previous fatal accidents [9]. In the same year, the
National Patient Safety Agency published a Rapid
Response Report on the same theme [11]; the Francophone
journal, Prescrire, followed up on this in 2009 [12].
The advice in Table 1 is a synthesis of the recommen-
dations in Prescrire, from the UK’s National Health Ser-
vice and from the ISMP [10–12], as well as from the
Ishikawa diagram in Fig. 1.
Conclusion
Different formulations of amphotericin B are not inter-
changeable. A confusion between the deoxycholate and
liposomal formulation caused a series of serious ADEs for
a young child, although the final outcome was favourable.
In the case reported, a community pharmacist made an
inappropriate drug substitution that caused the ADEs. In
our discussion, we explained the differences between
amphotericin B formulations, notably the specific toxicity
associated with the deoxycholate detergent in Fungizone.
Subsequently, we put this error into the Swiss context,
which explained how a drug designed for specific intensive
care can be dispensed by a community pharmacy. Devel-
oping on an Ishikawa diagram taken from the literature, we
brought together all the potential contributing factors to
this error and added those that were identified specifically
following analysis of the ADE. Thus, the absence of a
shared medical record, the use of health information
technologies without a solid understanding of their intrinsic
limitations, and the insufficient application of safety checks
when confronted with unfamiliar pathologies were all
major contributing causes to this error.
We proposed some solutions to help avoid these con-
tributing factors, notably using medical prescriptions to
better transmit important information, information that a
Table 1 Synthesis of recommendations for limiting adverse drug events
Detailed information on drugs must be available immediately and easily
Train and inform staff about any non-equivalent formulations sharing the same International Non-proprietary Name, and plan for labelling
them differently or flagging them in some other way
Doubt never benefits the patient. Before prescribing, dispensing or administering a drug that raises doubt or is unfamiliar, the drug name and
dose must be verified
Include ‘technological’ formulations of drugs on your establishment’s high-alert list of medications to watch out for, and perform a careful
validation of drug entries when putting in place computerised prescription or dispensing systems
For drugs on the high-alert list, use the complete generic name including excipients, formulation specificities and the brand name at each stage
in its use, from prescription to administration, i.e. amphotericin B deoxycholate (Fungizone) or amphotericin B liposomal (AmBisome)
When a product is designated as ‘high risk’, explaining the risks associated with that drug makes the message sink home
Prescribe the drug as a dose/kg/day and as a total daily dose
Computer software does not mean that critical monitoring of drug prescriptions no longer needs to be carried out, and pharmacological
knowledge is mandatory
With specific regard to amphotericin B deoxycholate (Fungizone), remember the benchmark dose of 1 mg/kg/day
When amphotericin B must be handled or dispensed outside of a specialised pharmacy, its storage must be subject to an appropriate risk
evaluation
Ensure that patients (and their families) take an active part in their treatment safety by teaching them about the drugs that are administered to
them
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suitably informed patient can substantiate if he/she has
expert understanding about his own treatment. A
table synthesising recommendations for limiting ADEs was
also presented. Finally, because everyone is responsible for
a link in the patient-safety chain, we brought up the pos-
sibility of healthcare professionals, not national agencies,
suggesting modifications to the INN classification to the
World Health Organization. This is precisely what we have
done in proposing that amphotericin B deoxycholate be
classified as an INNM.
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